Germany's Economic Conquest of Czechoslovakia (1941).pdf

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DR~

ANTONIN[BASCH

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC

CONQUEST OF

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Published by

The

CzechotloYak National Council of America

4049 W. 26th Street,

~hicago,

Illinois

(34

~+C

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/'t /

1. From the moment that Germany began to gain poli-

tical weight after

1933

and began to solidify her international

position, she renewed her former efforts to procure the

greatest possible influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

Gennan expansion has always turned in that direction, and

the current German imperialism only invented new slogans

to justify its policy. This time it was primarily an economic

slogan which succeeded, for various reasons, in creating a

favorable reaction among the other

~reat

powers. At a time

when international trade conditions were depressed, and

when the general economic situation in this part of Europe

was unfavorable, Germany systematically proclaimed the

necessity of creating a great economic

space-Grossraum-

1virtschaft-in

which it would be possible

consolidate eco-

nomic and social conditions. Immedi·ately following this came

the announcement that Central and Eastern Europe consti-

tuted a natural part of the German

"living space"

although,

at the time, no mention was made of just what was meant

by this conception. The West considered it from the trade

and economics standpoint, Germany from the standpoint of

politics and expansion.

The West had no objections to the thesis that the States

in Central and Eastern Europe naturally belong primarily in

Germany's economic sphere of interest. After all, Germany's

trade relations with this area were and are by their very

character more intensive and on a greater scale than those

of other industrial countries, and one often heard in the West

that since the '"'·estern countries were unable to purchase the

exportable surplus of agricultural and other products from

the Central European orbit, it was only to be expected th·at

these products should go to Germany; also, that the economic

condition of all these countries would improve within the

framework of a

Grossraum1v1"rtscha{t.

There can be no

theoretical objection to the idea of greater economic units if

their purpose be an economic strengthening and consolida-

tion through the agreement and co-operation of all concerned.

But that was not the German idea, which had in mind the

creation of a

German Empire

by way of

least resistance

and

with the smallest possible sacrifice.

This was not understood, however, in the West; and,

with the exception of Italy, the great power showed no great

-3-

interest in trade relations with Central and Eastern Europe,

while there was still time for such interest to produce any

positive results.

The German conception of "living space" in South-

eastern Europe amounts to the claim that Germany has a

natural right "to dominate" this sphere. Up to the present

moment German doctrine has offered no definition of the

conception "living space." A normal interpretation of it

might be territory within whose limits a nation could expand

and carry on settlement. However, the area of Central and

Eastern Europe would be eminently unsuitable for such a

purpose. The industrial parts ·are as thickly populated as

similar regions in Germany, and the agricultural sections

have, relatively, the greatest agricultural population in

Europe. These regions suffered from agricultural over-popu-

lation long before 1914, when yearly more than one quarter

of a million farm workers emigrated overseas. These areas

are, therefore, in no way suitable territory for new coloni-

zation. So it must be clear that Germany's intention could

not have been to find territory there for the collective settling

of its inhabitants; its real goal was

to mastet· this enti-re

S]Jhere, first economically and then politically.

The German plan was to co-ordinate this terri tory eco-

nomicaJly with the Reich in the interests of German needs and

aspirations. The production of raw materials and provisions

necessary to Germany was to be increased (for example, the

treaty between Germany and Rumania, March, 1939, lists

minerals, mineral oils, soy-bean, flax and food products of

all kinds) and in return Germany was to supply industrial

products and war materials. The deciding factor was not the

economic and social needs of these countries or even the con-

siderations of rentability and competitiveness but, above all

and exclusively, the needs and interests of Germany in regard

to its political and military position. It does not matter to

Germany that in these agricultural, over-populated countries

the inhabitants can be employed only by acceleration of the

rate of general economic activity and, particularly, by the

consistent building-up of suitable industrial production, with-

out which it is impossible to raise their low social standard

and buying capacity.

Because of this, it was clear from the very beginning to

all experts of the economics of Central and South-Eastern

Europe that Germany was following a political and imperial-

istic goal and was not, in any way, trying to improve the

economic and social conditions of these States. Germany

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